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This research draws on ideas about emotion-related appraisal tendencies to generate and test 
novel propositions about intergroup emotions. First, emotion elicited by outgroup category 
activation can be transferred to an unrelated stimulus (incidental emotion effects). Second, 
people predisposed toward an emotion are more prejudiced toward groups that are likely to be 
associated with that emotion. Discussion focuses on the implications of the studies for a more 
complete understanding of the nature of prejudice, and specifi cally, the different qualities of 
prejudice for different target groups.
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Recently, researchers from divergent traditions 
have explored how bias toward outgroups can be 
manifested as different emotions (e.g. Cottrell & 
Neuberg, 2005; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; 
Mackie, Devos, & Smith, 2000; Smith, 1993). 
For example, researchers in the stereotype trad-
ition have linked stereotypes of incompetence 
or interpersonal aloofness to pity, contempt, 
or envy (Fiske et al., 2002). From another 
perspective, researchers focusing on context-
specifi c judgments showed that perceptions of 
outgroup strength or weakness relative to the 
ingroup generated different negative emotions, 
such as anger, disgust, or fear (Mackie et al., 
2000). Still others have illustrated differences 
in emotion toward outgroups by examining 
responsibility and blame perceptions (Weiner, 
Perry, & Magnusson, 1988) or archetypal images 
of barbarian, enemy, and imperialist (Alexander, 
Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999). 
One study has specifi cally linked apprais-
als and distinct emotions toward outgroups. 
Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) focused on a spe-
cifi c kind of appraisal—threat—and distinct 
emotions toward outgroups. They predicted 
and found correlational evidence for the notion 
that outgroups activate specifi c threats, such 
as contamination or harm, and these threats 
are associated with distinct emotions, such as 
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disgust or anger, respectively. They argue that 
intergroup emotions are activated by threat 
appraisals, specifi cally, because groups pose 
evolutionarily significant ‘socio-functional 
threats’, including competition for resources, 
attack, disease, and non-reciprocation. The 
present two studies extend this reasoning and 
its related fi ndings to the study of individual 
differences in emotion and prejudice, and to 
the possibility that stereotypes prime emotional 
responses to unrelated stimuli.
Prejudice from an emotion 
perspective
Emotions are assumed to be responses to cogni-
tive appraisals (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 
1989; Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). 
Specifi cally, appraisals are ways of perceiving 
people or events according to evolutionarily 
significant themes, such as attack, loss, or 
disease. In addition to physical survival and 
reproduction, appraisals are attuned to social-
moral problems, such as injustice, impurity, and 
greed (Giner-Sorolla & Gutierrez, 2005; Haidt, 
2003; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Lazarus, 1991; 
Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Weiner, 
1993). For example, an appraisal of a person as 
behaving in a lazy, irresponsible, or unfair way 
tends to elicit anger (Lazarus, 1991; Shaver, 
Schwartz, Kirson, & O’Connor, 1987; Weiner 
et al., 1988). Outgroups may elicit emotion by 
activating either type of appraisal, relating to a 
basic appraisal theme (e.g. contagion eliciting 
disgust) or a socio-moral theme (e.g. violations 
of community norms eliciting contempt). 
Advances in the study of emotion generate 
at least three general predictions relevant to 
the study of emotion and prejudice. First is 
that perceptions of specifi c groups and their 
attendant stereotypes elicit distinct emotional 
responses. This thesis has been explored with 
a great deal of success in the past 10 years (e.g. 
Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Fiske et al., 2002; 
Smith, 1993).1
The second proposition, which we tested in 
Study 1, is that emotion elicited by an outgroup 
can be transferred to unrelated stimuli. This 
phenomenon is known as incidental emotion. 
Studies of incidental effects of emotion have 
found that emotions, most notably anger, 
sadness, fear, and disgust, infl uence judgments of 
stimuli unrelated to the elicitor of the emotion 
in ways that are congruent with that emotion’s 
appraisal theme (DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, 
& Cajdric, 2004; Keltner, Ellsworth, & Edwards, 
1993; Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001; Tiedens & 
Linton, 2001). The broad implication of this 
proposition is that reactions to outgroups 
should infl uence emotions toward any people, 
events, and objects encountered after the out-
group category is activated. The incidental 
emotion should be specifi c to the appraisal 
tendency and emotion originally activated by 
the outgroup. In other words, an anger-eliciting 
group should potentiate anger toward unrelated 
stimuli, whereas a disgust-eliciting group should 
potentiate disgust toward the same stimuli. 
Furthermore, differential emotional responses 
to ostensibly unrelated stimuli can be used to 
infer the content of the emotional response to 
the groups who are primed.
A third thesis is that individuals predis-
posed toward an emotion should be more preju-
diced toward outgroups whose stereotypic 
traits would be likely to elicit that emotion. 
An emotional disposition refl ects a tendency 
toward more frequent episodes, more intense 
experiences, and more intense expressions 
of a particular emotion (Kagan & Snidman, 
1991; Malatesta, 1990; Spielberger, Sydeman, 
Owen, & Marsh, 1999). Based on an appraisal 
tendency perspective, an emotional disposition 
should be associated with a heightened tendency 
to construe events, objects, and people in line 
with the appraisal tendency associated with that 
emotion (Lerner & Keltner, 2000, 2001). With 
regard to outgroups, individuals predisposed 
toward an emotion are likely to be more preju-
diced, that is, experience more frequent and 
intense affect, toward groups that tend to acti-
vate the emotion. For example, anger-prone 
individuals would be more prejudiced toward 
groups that activate anger-related appraisals 
(e.g. harm, injustice). Evidence in support of 
this proposition, which we pursue in Study 2, 
advances the fi eld in two ways, in that it helps 
to explain individual differences in prejudice 
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while bolstering the evidence for differentiation 
in emotional reactions to outgroups.
We hypothesized that priming thoughts of 
African-Americans would tend to elicit anger 
in response to unrelated stimuli in Study 1 and 
prejudice against Blacks would be associated with 
dispositional anger in Study 2. These predictions 
were based on appraisal research, which has 
shown that injustice appraisals evoke anger (e.g. 
Rozin et al., 1999; Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, & 
Banaszynski, 2001), and justice-related themes of 
stereotypes of African-Americans (e.g. Devine, 
1989), such as ‘low-achieving’ and ‘free-loading’. 
These predictions also follow from previous 
studies, which have documented associations 
between stereotypes of African-Americans and 
anger. Prejudice toward African-Americans 
has been associated with anger, in terms of 
self-reported emotion (Cottrell & Neuberg, 
2005; Stephan & Stephan, 1985), and measured 
changes in facial musculature, where Whites 
who viewed African-American faces showed 
changes in the corrugator supercilii associated 
with anger (Vanman, Paul, Ito, & Miller, 1997; 
Vanman, Saltz, Nathan, Warren, 2004). 
We hypothesized that the gay stereotype would 
be associated with disgust, given the centrality 
of impurity to both the gay stereotype (e.g. ‘dis-
eased’, ‘abnormal’, ‘inappropriate sexuality’) and 
disgust (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997; 
Rozin et al., 1999; Vasquez et al., 2001). This 
hypothesis is supported, directly and implicitly, 
by studies of anti-gay attitudes and affect. People 
asked to describe their spontaneous reactions 
toward homosexuality indicate feeling ‘disgust’ 
(Guth et al., 2001; Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 
1993; Haidt & Hersh, 2001). More implicitly, 
measures of anti-gay attitudes often include 
an item assessing ‘disgust’ toward gays or 
same-sex sexual behavior (Frable, Wortman, & 
Joseph, 1997; Herek, 1994; LaMar & Kite, 1998; 
Larsen, Reed, & Hoffman, 1980). Individuals 
predisposed toward experiencing disgust tend to 
report prejudice toward gays (Ernulf & Innala, 
1987; Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994; Olatunji, 
Lohr, & Meunier, 2002; Van de Ven, Bornholt, & 
Bailey, 1996). As another example, Cottrell and 
Neuberg (2005) found that gays were perceived 
as a contamination threat, by threatening disease 
and, more metaphorically, by threatening 
traditional values. Furthermore, Cottrell and 
Neuberg (2005) found the perception of gays 
as a contamination threat was associated with 
disgust and pity toward the group.
Study 1: Incidental emotion resulting 
from priming of groups 
In Study 1, we ask whether thinking about 
African-Americans and gays will actually lead 
to incidental effects of anger and disgust, re-
spectively, on the interpretation of unrelated 
stimuli. Our reasoning is that over time outgroups 
become chronically linked with specifi c emotions 
through repeated association of the stereotype 
and the emotion-related appraisal. Once an as-
sociation is formed, exposure to any outgroup 
cue (e.g. a label or image) should activate the 
appraisal and elicit the corresponding emo-
tion, without requiring direct activation of 
the stereotype. Study 1 tests this by priming 
outgroups with stimuli devoid of stereotype 
content and examining subsequent emotional 
reactions.
Previous studies have found that emotions, 
most notably anger, sadness, fear, and disgust, 
infl uence judgments of stimuli unrelated to the 
elicitor of the emotion in ways that are congruent 
with the emotion’s underlying appraisal tendency 
(DeSteno et al., 2004; Keltner et al., 1993; Lerner 
& Keltner, 2000, 2001; Tiedens & Linton, 2001). 
With respect to prejudice, this suggests that 
exposure to African-American primes should 
evoke greater anger, and exposure to gay primes 
should evoke greater disgust, in response to the 
unrelated stimuli. 
Select studies suggest that prejudice toward 
African-Americans produces incidental anger. 
In a study assessing automatic stereotype acti-
vation, European-Americans were exposed to 
subliminally presented African-American or 
European-American faces and their behavior was 
assessed in response to a vexatious request by a 
confederate (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). 
Participants primed with African-American 
faces responded to the request with more hos-
tile behavior, which may have resulted from the 
activation and self-application of the hostile 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(1)
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Black stereotype, or the activation of an anger 
response to the Black group. Research on preju-
dice and facial perception fi nds that implicit 
prejudice toward African-Americans facilitates 
perceiving anger in African-American faces and 
not in European-American faces (Hugenberg & 
Bodenhausen, 2003). Whether thinking about 
African-Americans causes anger was not tested. 
No known study provides precedent regarding 
incidental emotions following activation of 
thoughts about gays. 
In Study 1, we measured participants’ emotions 
toward an unrelated stimulus after exposing them 
to outgroup priming. Based on past research 
and the appraisal tendency model, we expected 
African-American priming to lead to incidental 
anger and fear. In contrast, gay priming should 
lead to incidental disgust and, to a lesser extent, 
anger. We predicted that outgroup priming 
would produce no signifi cant differences in 
the other emotions assessed (contempt, guilt, 
sympathy, and shame), despite these emotions 
being implicated in other models of intergroup 
emotions, because these emotions are not pri-
marily implicated in appraisals of the groups 
we primed.
Method
Participants The sample included 115 under-
graduate participants (60 males and 55 females) 
recruited from the psychology research par-
ticipant pool at the University of California, 
Berkeley. They received partial course credit 
for completing the study. Participants were on 
average 20.1 years old (SD = 2.1). The sample 
included 31 Caucasian students, 47 East Asian 
students, 18 Southeast Asian students, 10 Latino 
students, 6 students of mixed race/ethnicity, 
and 3 students who did not specify their race/
ethnicity.
Procedure Participants were divided into two 
conditions, one condition priming African-
American males and another condition priming 
gay males. The prime consisted of unscrambling 
word sets to form sentences that involved African-
American males (n = 60) or gay males (n = 55). 
Participants each unscrambled 20 sentences, 15 
of which referred to the target group and 5 of 
which were fi llers. The primes were designed 
to activate the group construct. An example 
of an African-American prime is the word set 
‘being identifi es as Deion for Black’, which 
read unscrambled, with the extra word (‘for’) 
eliminated, ‘Deion identifi es as being Black’. One 
of the gay male primes was ‘to a gay club John 
goes dance from’, which unscrambles to, ‘John 
goes to a gay dance club’. Another gay male prime 
was, unscrambled, ‘Drew joins a gay chatroom’. 
As these examples illustrate, the primes directly 
activated the idea of the group, and a few also 
mentioned behaviors that participants may 
have construed as characteristic, but did not 
directly activate the emotions hypothesized to 
be associated with the groups.
After the priming, in an ostensibly unrelated 
task, participants were randomly assigned to 
read one of two brief stories that were designed, 
and determined through pilot testing, to describe a 
person behaving in ways that could evoke anger, 
disgust, and/or fear. The race/ethnicity and 
sexual orientation of the person in the story 
was indeterminate. Participants were asked to 
indicate their emotional response to the story 
and to describe the protagonist in fi ve words or 
phrases. Participants reported no awareness of a 
connection between the priming and emotion 
ratings. At the end of the study, participants 
were debriefed and given course credit for their 
participation.
The purpose of the study was to determine 
if group priming elicits emotional reactions 
which, in turn, may be incidentally attributed 
to an unrelated stimulus. Accordingly, the tar-
get stimulus stories were developed to allow 
for comparable attributions of anger, disgust, 
and fear. One story (n = 57) described the par-
ticipant as working to help pay for college. 
The participant’s work supervisor suggests 
that he may have to lay off the participant 
(intended to resonate with a fear response). 
Then the supervisor trips over machinery, 
which rips open his leg, exposing bone and 
gushing blood (disgust). After spending the 
day obtaining medical care for the supervisor, 
the supervisor tells the participant that he gave 
away the participant’s promotion to his own son 
(anger). The other story (n = 58) described the 
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participant walking by a homeless man on the 
street late at night. The homeless man reeks of 
body odor, urine, and vomit (disgust). He jumps 
at the participant, demanding his or her wallet 
(fear). The participant gives it to him, losing the 
only money the participant has to buy presents 
for the holidays (anger). 
Emotion ratings Participants rated how much 
anger, fear, disgust, contempt, sympathy, shame, 
and guilt they experienced, after reading the 
story, on scales ranging from 0 (no emotion) to 
6 (extreme emotion).
Results
We predicted that priming the African-American 
category would elicit more anger and fear than 
other emotions, and priming the gay male cat-
egory would elicit more disgust and to a lesser 
extent, anger, than other emotions in response 
to the target story. We examined the effect of 
priming on anger, disgust, and fear ratings by 
conducting mixed-factor analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) analyses on emotion ratings, test-
ing for the interaction of prime and emotion. 
Story version was entered as a covariate because 
the stories evoked different levels of anger, 
disgust, and fear.2 Because women sometimes 
report feeling more intense emotion than 
men do (Choti, Marston, Holston, & Hart, 1987; 
Greenwald, Cook, & Lang, 1989; Schwartz, 
Brown, & Ahern, 1980), we checked whether 
emotion ratings differed by gender. Men and 
women did not differ significantly in their 
ratings of contempt, sympathy, shame, or guilt, 
but, consistent with previous studies, women 
reported signifi cantly more anger and fear, and 
marginally signifi cantly more disgust, than men.3 
Accordingly, gender was entered as a covariate 
in the analyses. 
To isolate the effect of group priming on just 
anger and disgust, a mixed-factor ANCOVA 
was conducted on emotion ratings with prime, 
type of emotion, and the theoretically relevant 
interactions as predictors, and story version 
and participant gender as covariates. The 
interaction of critical interest to our predictions, 
the interaction of emotion type (anger versus 
disgust) and outgroup prime, was signifi cant 
(F(1,108) = 5.43, p < .05). Simple comparisons 
revealed that the African-American prime 
elicited signifi cantly more anger (M = 3.87, 
SD = 1.81) than disgust (M = 3.40, SD = 1.92) 
(t(59) = –2.45, p < .05) (See Table 1). In contrast, 
the gay prime elicited comparable levels of anger 
(M = 4.09, SD = 1.83) and disgust (M = 4.04, 
SD = 1.81) (t(53) = –0.25, ns). Furthermore, 
the gay prime elicited marginally signifi cantly 
more disgust than did the African-American 
prime (t(112) = 1.82, p = .07).4
Relatively low levels of fear were reported 
in response to both primes. Given that caveat, 
we tested the pattern of fear and disgust as a 
function of priming by conducting a mixed-factor 
ANCOVA on fear and disgust ratings with prime, 
emotion, and their interaction as predictors, 
and story version and participant gender as 
covariates. The analysis revealed no signifi cant 
Table 1. Emotions elicited by outgroup priming, Study 1 (N = 114)
 Means by prime Comparison by prime*
  
Emotion African-American Gay t p
Anger 3.87a 4.09a 0.61 .54
Disgust 3.40b 4.04a 1.82 .07
Fear 2.05c 2.87bc 2.11 .04
Contempt 3.27b 3.25b –0.05 .96
Sympathy 2.37c 2.31c –0.17 .87
Shame 0.93d 1.62d 2.38 .02
Guilt 0.70d 1.31d 2.48 .02
* Means in the same row were analyzed by t test for equality of means. Means in the same column that do not 
share subscripts differ signifi cantly p < .05 in the t test for equality of means.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(1)
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interaction of emotion (fear versus disgust) 
and outgroup prime (F(1,110) = 1.64, ns), nor 
a signifi cant main effect of prime (F(1,110) = 
2.40, ns). Simple comparisons revealed that 
the gay prime elicited signifi cantly more fear 
(M = 2.87, SD = 2.06) than the African-American 
prime (M = 2.05, SD = 2.13) (t(113) = 2.11, 
p < .05). As noted earlier, the gay prime elicited 
marginally signifi cantly more disgust than the 
African-American prime.5
We would have additional support for the 
emotion specifi city hypothesis if other emotions 
included in the study—contempt, sympathy, 
guilt, and shame—did not differ signifi cantly by 
outgroup priming. In line with this prediction, 
there were no signifi cant differences in contempt 
or sympathy as a function of priming. Shame 
and guilt, however, were higher following the 
gay prime than the African-American prime, 
though participants reported relatively low levels 
of these emotions overall. 
Discussion
Study 1 demonstrated that outgroups can 
spontaneously elicit specifi c emotions without 
directly activating stereotypes or appraisals 
associated with those emotions. Furthermore, 
this study tested whether intergroup emotions 
can have incidental effects on perceptions of 
unrelated stimuli. As predicted, the outgroup 
primes elicited different patterns of incidental 
emotions. The African-American prime elicited 
more anger than any other emotion assessed. 
The gay prime elicited high levels of disgust and 
anger, and more disgust than did the African-
American prime. Fear was signifi cantly higher 
in response to the gay prime, though relatively 
low levels of fear were reported in response 
to both primes. In retrospect, asking partici-
pants to report experiencing fear in response 
to a hypothetical situation is problematic, fear 
being an emotion that may be less prone to 
vicarious experience than other emotions (see 
also Mackie et al., 2000).
That the two primes elicited similar levels 
of contempt and sympathy provides further 
support for emotion specifi city in prejudice 
because these emotions are not expected to 
be differentially associated with the primed 
groups, providing a basis for comparison. The 
fi nding that incidental contempt did not differ 
by outgroup priming was particularly important 
for several reasons. First, this is the fi rst study 
of intergroup emotion to distinguish contempt 
toward outgroups from other negative emotions 
such as anger, disgust, and fear. Other studies 
have examined contempt in combination 
with anger (Fiske et al., 2002) or fear (Mackie 
et al., 2000), and have therefore not been able 
to differentiate contempt from other emotions, 
as Study 1 did. Second, contempt was one of 
several emotions that did not reveal a main 
effect of emotional intensity by outgroup prime. 
Emotions were generally stronger in response 
to the gay prime than the African-American 
prime. However, contempt as well as sympathy 
yielded no such difference, providing further 
evidence that emotional responses to outgroups 
are differentiated, not just yoked to overall 
negative affect.
Based on our fi ndings in Study 1, we expect 
prejudice leads to other emotion-specific 
incidental effects, in addition to the experience 
of emotions and interpretation of stimuli in 
line with particular appraisal tendencies. For 
example, outgroup-elicited emotion could 
activate incidental action tendencies congruent 
with the emotion, such as hostile behavior 
following exposure to an anger-eliciting outgroup 
(e.g. Bargh et al., 1996). As another example, 
prejudice could elicit emotion-specifi c responses 
in the autonomic nervous system (Levenson, 
Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). 
Study 2: Individual differences in 
emotion and prejudice
Thus far, we have seen that activating thoughts 
of different outgroups leads to differential emo-
tional reactions to subsequent stimuli, providing 
evidence for incidental emotion in intergroup 
perceptions and group-emotion specifi city in 
prejudice. In Study 2, we sought further evidence 
of group-emotion specifi city in prejudice by 
assessing whether individuals predisposed to 
experiencing an emotion are more prejudiced 
toward outgroups whose stereotypes and at-
tendant appraisals are associated with the 
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emotion. We expect that anger-prone individuals 
are likely to be more prejudiced toward groups 
associated with that emotion’s appraisals (harm 
or injustice), such as African-Americans, and not 
toward groups associated with other appraisals. 
We further predict that disgust-prone people 
would be more prejudiced toward groups 
associated with that emotion’s appraisals 
(impurity or contamination), such as gay men. 
Though not tested in comparison with other 
emotional dispositions, disgust sensitivity has 
been associated with prejudice toward gays 
(Ernulf & Innala, 1987; Haidt et al., 1994; 
Olatunji et al., 2002; Van de Ven et al., 1996). 
Method
Participants The sample consisted of 81 under-
graduate males recruited from the psychology 
participant pool at the University of California, 
Berkeley. Only males were included in the 
study because pilot testing revealed that males 
and females differed significantly on both 
the predictors (anger and disgust proneness) 
and dependent outcomes (prejudice toward 
African-Americans and gay males). Participants 
received partial course credit for the study. 
Participants were on average 19.7 years old 
(SD = 1.6) and included 40 Asian students, 
39 Caucasian students, and 2 Middle Eastern 
students. African-American, gay, or bisexual 
students were not recruited; all 81 participants 
reported being heterosexual.
Procedure Participants completed a question-
naire that contained measures of dispositions 
for anger and disgust, prejudice toward 
African-Americans and gay males, and other 
measures described below. Participants were 
then debriefed and given course credit for their 
participation.
Measures
Emotional disposition Participants completed 
the 32-item Disgust Scale, Version 2 (Haidt 
et al., 1994), which assessed differences in 
disgust sensitivity (e.g. ‘It would make me un-
comfortable to hear a couple making love in 
the next room of a hotel’). The scale assessed 
four domains: sex, death/envelope violations, 
interpersonal, and core disgust. Reliability was 
high for the total scale (α = .88) and moderately 
high for subscales (Sex α = .79, Death α = .72, 
Interpersonal α = .80, and Core α = .59). Items 
were rated on 4-point Likert scales. Half of the 
items were labeled Strongly disagree (1) to Strongly 
agree (4); half were labeled Not disgusting at all 
(1) to Very disgusting (4). 
Participants completed the 20-item Trait 
Anger scale (a subscale of the State-Trait Anger 
Expression Inventory; Spielberger, 1996), which 
assessed a disposition to experience angry feelings 
as a personality trait (e.g. ‘I feel infuriated when I 
do a good job and get a poor evaluation’). Items 
were rated on 4-point Likert scales (1 = Almost 
never, 4 = Almost always). Ratings were averaged 
to create a reliable composite index (α = .83). 
Trait anger scores were signifi cantly positively 
correlated with disgust sensitivity (r(81) = .32, 
p < .01) and sex-related disgust sensitivity (r(81) = 
.32, p < .01).
Prejudice toward African-Americans Participants 
completed the 10-item Anti-Black Attitudes 
Scale (Katz & Hass, 1988), including items 
such as, ‘The root cause of most of the social 
and economic ills of blacks is the weakness and 
instability of a black family’. Items were rated 
on 5-point Likert scales (1 = Strongly disagree, 
5 = Strongly agree). The measure showed good 
reliability (α = .83). 
Prejudice toward gay males Participants com-
pleted the 10-item Attitudes toward Gay Men 
scale (Herek, 1988), including items such as, 
‘Homosexual behavior between two men is just 
plain wrong’. Items were rated on 5-point Likert 
scales (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly agree). 
The measure showed high reliability (α = .89). 
Anti-gay attitudes were further assessed by 
subscales of the Components of Attitudes toward 
Homosexuality scale (LaMar & Kite, 1998). 
The Gay Male Stereotypes subscale consists 
of seven items that assess people’s stereotypes 
about gay males (e.g. ‘Most gay men have a life 
of one night stands’). To assess anxiety about 
attraction and sexual advances from members 
of the same sex, four items were used from the 
14-item Contact subscale (e.g. ‘I would feel 
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 10(1)
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uncomfortable if a member of my sex made an 
advance toward me’). Items were rated on 5-point 
Likert scales (1 = Strongly disagree, 5 = Strongly 
agree). Stereotype (α = .64) and Contact (α = .73) 
subscales showed reasonable reliability and were 
marginally positively correlated (r(81) = 0.20, 
p = .07). All measures of gay prejudice were 
signifi cantly positively correlated (average r(81) = 
.42, minimum r(81) = .2, maximum r(81) = .58). 
Scale scores for Anti-Gay Attitudes, Contact, and 
Stereotypes were standardized and averaged to 
form a composite index of prejudice against gay 
males (α = .68). 
Ideology Conservatism has been associated with 
prejudice toward many outgroups, including 
African-Americans (Sears & Henry, 2003; 
Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996) and gays (Herek, 
2000; Whitley, 1999). Thus, we assessed political 
ideology in order to control for its effects. Par-
ticipants completed a single-item measure of 
liberal-conservative ideology: ‘With regard 
to political ideology, where would you place 
yourself on the following scale from extremely 
liberal to extremely conservative?’ (adapted 
from the National Election Survey; National 
Election Studies, 2004). Such direct measures 
of ideology are known to have good construct 
validity (Knight, 1999). The item was rated on 
a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Extremely liberal, 4 = 
Moderate, 7 = Extremely conservative). 
Results
We examined the effects of predisposition 
toward anger (trait anger) and disgust (sex-
related disgust sensitivity),6 as well as ideology 
on prejudice toward African-Americans and 
gay males. Thus, trait anger, sex-related disgust 
sensitivity, and ideology were entered into simul-
taneous regression analyses predicting prejudice 
toward these groups.
Anger and anti-Black prejudice We predicted 
emotion specifi city for anti-Black prejudice in 
that a predisposition toward anger, and not toward 
disgust, would relate to stronger prejudice toward 
African-Americans. To test this hypothesis, we 
conducted a simultaneous regression analysis 
on the Anti-Black Attitudes measure, with trait 
anger, sex-related disgust sensitivity, and ideology 
as predictors.7 In line with our hypothesis, trait 
anger was a signifi cant predictor (β = .23, p < 
.05, one-tailed) of anti-Black prejudice, whereas 
there was a very small, nonsignifi cant effect of 
sex-related disgust sensitivity (β = .05, ns) (See 
Table 2). 
Disgust and gay male prejudice We also pre-
dicted emotion specifi city for anti-gay prejudice, 
in that a predisposition toward disgust, and not 
toward anger, would relate to stronger prejudice 
against gay males. We conducted a simultaneous 
regression on the gay male prejudice composite, 
as was described for anti-Black prejudice. As pre-
dicted, sex disgust was a strong predictor (β = .38, 
p < .001, one-tailed), whereas the effect of trait 
anger was not signifi cant (β = .11, ns).8
Ideology Ideology had a marginally signifi cant 
main effect on anti-Black attitudes (β = .21, p = 
.07, two-tailed), in line with previous research 
(e.g. Sears & Henry, 2003; Sidanius et al., 1996), 
Table 2. Summary of simultaneous regression analyses for individual differences in emotional disposition and 
ideology predicting prejudice, Study 2 (N = 81)
 Prejudice 
 
 African-American  Gay 
  
Variable B β B β
Trait anger .15 .23*a .09 .11
Sex-related disgust sensitivity .03 .05 .30 .38***a
Ideology .14 .21† .24 .31***
* p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; † p < .1. *p a One-tailed.
35
Parker Tapias et al. emotion and prejudice
and a signifi cant main effect on anti-gay attitudes 
(β = .31, p < .01), replicating other studies of anti-
gay attitudes (Herek, 2000; Whitley, 1999).
Discussion
Study 2 yielded evidence that prejudice is asso-
ciated with specifi c emotions toward outgroups. 
Prejudice toward African-Americans is primarily 
associated with the disposition to experience 
anger, whereas prejudice toward gay males 
is associated with the disposition to experience 
disgust. More conservative political attitudes 
related to stronger prejudice against both 
African-Americans and gay males, regardless 
of male participants’ predisposition toward 
anger or disgust.
General discussion
Guided by conceptual models of relations be-
tween outgroup bias and distinct emotion (e.g. 
Smith, 1993), we conducted two studies that 
examined hypothesized associations between 
prejudice, toward African Americans and gays, 
and emotions, particularly anger and disgust. In 
Study 1, indirect priming of African Americans 
led to relatively high anger experiences in 
response to subsequently presented stimuli, 
whereas exposure to the gay primes elicited 
disgust, and to a lesser extent, anger, although 
anger was not greater in response to Black 
primes than gay primes, in contradiction of our 
prediction. In Study 2, individual differences in 
anger and disgust were differentially related to 
prejudice toward African Americans and gays, 
respectively. The present studies build upon 
previous research linking African American 
stereotypes with anger and gay stereotypes with 
disgust (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) by showing 
that groups can prime emotional reactions to 
unrelated stimuli and that these associations are 
evident at the trait or disposition level.
Evidence for disgust toward gays was revealed 
by incidental disgust following gay priming in 
Study 1 and the close relationship between disgust 
sensitivity and anti-gay attitudes in Study 2. Study 
1 also revealed a relationship between anger and 
prejudice toward gays, in line with studies of 
heterosexual male homophobia and aggression 
toward gay men (e.g. Bernat, Calhoun, Adams, 
& Zeichner, 2001). Future research should 
explore the extent to which prejudice toward 
gays, in particular among heterosexual men, 
elicits anger, either in combination with or in 
lieu of disgust.
Although the fi ndings were promising, it is 
important to bear in mind their limitations. For 
example, while the present research found a 
relationship between prejudice toward African-
Americans and anger, Study 1 revealed at least as 
much anger toward the other primed outgroup 
too. Furthermore, the effects on fear responses 
in Study 1 were not as predicted.
Future studies should attempt to replicate 
these relationships and show generalizability 
to related outcomes, such as emotion-related 
psychophysiology, behavioral tendencies, or 
incidental effects on judgment. One promising 
line for future research would be to examine 
how the role of specifi c emotions in prejudice 
could help explain the diversity of discriminatory 
behaviors enacted against outgroup members 
(Swim, Cohen, & Hyers, 1998). The prevalence 
of intimidation and destruction in hate crimes 
targeting African-Americans (Federal Bureau 
of Investigation, 2004) may refl ect an anger 
response and the inclination to exact retribution. 
That anti-gay hate crimes disproportionately 
involve physical assaults (Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2004), for example, may refl ect 
a physical disgust response. 
In addition to predicting overt behavior, 
a focus on emotions can sharpen studies 
of how prejudice plays out in more subtle, 
face-to-face interactions between members of 
different groups. In line with this proposition, 
studies of intergroup interactions show that 
outgroup members are frequently affected 
by ingroup members’ nonverbal expressions 
(Blascovich, Mendes, Hunter, & Lickel, 2000; 
Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Word, 
Zanna, & Cooper, 1974). By specifying anger, 
fear, contempt, and disgust as distinct aspects 
of prejudice, behaviors as diverse as fl eeing, 
attacking, avoiding eye contact, and refraining 
from touching, differentially associated with 
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these emotions, should occur with different 
frequencies in responses to particular groups 
and should be interpreted differently. Prejudice, 
therefore, clearly has a more complex form than 
can be captured in a unidimensional ‘valence’ 
conceptualization. This complexity, to the extent 
that we can map and understand it, should yield 
more precise predictions and explanations of 
intergroup behavior.
Notes
1. In two pilot studies we established that 
traits used to describe various minority 
groups clustered into four primary groups 
(corresponding to Asians and Jews; Blacks, 
Disabled, and Homeless; Latinos and Native 
Americans; with Gays being in their own 
group) and that when the trait clusters used to 
describe these groups were presented without 
group identifying labels, participants indicated 
differential emotional responses to them (e.g. 
more anger and fear toward Black stereotypes; 
more contempt toward Gay and Jewish 
stereotypes).
2. Because the design was counterbalanced (except 
for some minor differences in the sizes of the 
groups), and because we were concentrating on 
interactions, this difference had no effect on our 
conclusion. 
3. Women reported signifi cantly more anger 
(M = 4.36, SD = 1.59) than men (M = 3.60, 
SD = 1.92) (t(113) = 2.31, p < .05), and more 
fear (M = 3.05, SD = 2.31) than men (M = 1.88, 
SD = 1.78) (t(113) = 3.06, p < .01). Women also 
reported marginally signifi cantly more disgust 
(M = 4.05, SD = 1.67) than men (M = 3.37, 
SD = 2.03) (t(112) = 1.95, p = .05).
4. There was a signifi cant interaction of story 
version by emotion type indicating that the two 
story versions evoked differential differences 
in emotion responses (F(1,108) = 7.76, 
p < .01). Simple comparisons revealed that the 
supervisor story elicited equal levels of anger 
(M = 3.80, SD = 1.78) and disgust (M = 3.84, 
SD = 1.89) (t(55) = 1.77, ns). The homeless 
story elicited more anger (M = 4.14, SD = 1.84) 
than disgust (M = 3.57, SD = 1.90) (t(57) = 2.76, 
p < .01). Anger and disgust ratings did not 
differ signifi cantly between the supervisor and 
homeless stories.
5. Signifi cantly different levels of fear and disgust 
were evoked by story version (F(1,110) = 22.74, 
p < .001). Simple comparisons revealed that 
the homeless story elicited equal levels of fear 
(M = 3.31, SD = 2.11) and disgust (M = 3.57, 
SD = 1.90) (t(57) = –.90, ns). The supervisor 
story elicited more disgust (M = 3.84, SD = 1.85) 
than fear (M = 1.55, SD = 1.77) (t(55) = 6.77, 
p < .001). Disgust ratings did not differ 
signifi cantly between the supervisor and 
homeless stories. Fear ratings were signifi cantly 
higher for the homeless story than for the 
supervisor story, t(113) = 4.83, p < .001).
6. The same pattern of results was revealed when 
analyses were conducted using the full disgust 
sensitivity scale.
7. Interaction terms for ideology by trait anger 
and disgust were also included but were 
nonsignifi cant. Consequently, they are not 
included in the results reported here. Results 
did not differ as a function of presence of these 
interaction terms.
8. Because one item on Herek’s Attitudes toward 
Gay Men scale explicitly references disgust and 
several others could be construed as implying 
it, we conducted a principal components factor 
analysis of all the questionnaire items to test 
if there was overlap between attitudes toward 
gays and disgust sensitivity. The results clearly 
indicated that these scales were independent, 
with no gay prejudice items loading on the sex 
disgust factor and only one sex disgust item, 
regarding daily masturbation, loading (0.52) 
somewhat mysteriously on the gay prejudice 
factor.
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